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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
MARIA SOLEDAD RUIZ-SMALL, )
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
)

NOS. 46232-2018, 46233-2018
ADA COUNTY NOS. CR01-16-27448
CR01-18-19963
APPELLANT’S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After Maria S. Ruiz-Small pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance, the district
court sentenced her to five years, with two years fixed. The district court also revoked her
probation and imposed her underlying sentence of seven years, with three years fixed. The
district court later denied Ms. Ruiz-Small’s motion to reduce her sentences under Idaho Criminal
Rule 35 (“Rule 35”). Ms. Ruiz-Small now appeals. She argues the district court abused its
discretion by imposing an excessive sentence, revoking her probation, and denying her Rule 35
motions.
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Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In October 2016, the State charged Ms. Ruiz-Small with possession of a controlled
substance, petit theft, and possession of drug paraphernalia (CR01-16-27448). (R., pp.36–37, 49–
50.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Ms. Ruiz-Small pled guilty to possession of a controlled
substance. (R., p.65.) In June 2017, the district court sentenced her to probation, with an
underlying sentence of seven years, with three years fixed. (R., pp.79–83.)
In February 2018, the State moved for a bench warrant due to twelve alleged probation
violations. (R., pp.93–95.) Then, in April 2018, the State alleged Ms. Ruiz-Small committed two
new offenses: possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia (CR0118-19963). (R., pp.152–53.) In May 2018, the State filed an amended motion for a probation
violation, which added an alleged violation for the new charged offenses. (R., pp.117–19.)
Ms. Ruiz-Small waived a preliminary hearing in the new case, and the magistrate bound
her over to district court. (R., pp.159, 161–62.) The State filed an Information charging her with
possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.168–69.)
Later in May 2018, Ms. Ruiz-Small admitted to six of the probation violations for: (1) failing to
obtain permission before changing residences; (2) failing to obtain permission before leaving her
assigned district; (3) using methamphetamine; (4) failed to submit to urinalysis; (5) failing to
complete a substance abuse treatment program; and (6) absconding from probation. (Tr. Vol. I,1
p.11, L.1–p.14, L.1; R., p.123.)
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There are two transcripts on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, contains the admit/deny
hearing in CR01-16-27448, held on May 21, 2018, and the joint sentencing/disposition hearing,
held on June 25, 2018. The second, cited as Volume II, contains the entry of plea hearing in
CR01-18-19963, held on June 4, 2018.
2

In June 2018, in the new case, Ms. Ruiz-Small pled guilty to possession of a controlled
substance. (Tr. Vol. II, p.11, Ls.6–25; R., p.172.) The State agreed to recommend a sentence of
seven years, with two years fixed. (Tr. Vol. II, p.3, Ls.12–15.)
The district court consolidated the cases for purposes of sentencing and disposition for
the probation violations. (R., p.128.) On June 25, 2018, the district court held a joint sentencing
and disposition hearing. (R., pp.130, 180; see generally Tr. Vol. II, p.16, L.1–p.27, L.7.) The
State recommended the district court revoke Ms. Ruiz-Small’s probation and impose the
underlying seven-year sentence and, in the new case, sentence her to seven years, with two years
fixed, to be served concurrently. (Tr. Vol. I, p.21, Ls.5–10.) Ms. Ruiz requested that the district
court retain jurisdiction (“a rider”). (Tr. Vol. I, p.22, Ls.9–19.) The district revoked Ms. RuizSmall’s probation and imposed her sentence of seven years, with three years fixed. (Tr. Vol. I,
p.26, Ls.1–2; R., p.130.) In the new case, the district court sentenced her to five years, with two
years fixed. (Tr. Vol. I, p.26, Ls.3–7; R., p.180.) The sentences would run concurrently. (Tr. Vol.
I, p.26, Ls.7–9; R., pp.130, 180.)
On July 3, 2018, the district court entered an order revoking probation and a judgment of
conviction. (R., pp.131–33, 181–83.) In both cases, on July 12, 2018, Ms. Ruiz-Small moved to
reduce her sentence pursuant to Rule 35. (R., pp.135, 139, 188, 192.) On August 3, 2018,
Ms. Ruiz-Small filed a notice of appeal from the district court’s order of revocation and its
judgment of conviction. (R., pp.136–37, 189–90.) On August 21, 2018, the district court denied
her Rule 35 motions. (R., pp.143–44.)
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of five
years, with two years fixed, upon Ms. Ruiz-Small following her guilty plea to possession
of a controlled substance?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Ms. Ruiz-Small’s probation?

III.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. Ruiz-Small’s Rule 35
motions?

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Five Years,
With Two Years Fixed, Upon Ms. Ruiz-Small, Following Her Guilty Plea To Possession Of A
Controlled Substance
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has
the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing the
sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294
(1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Ms. Ruiz-Small’s sentence does not exceed the statutory
maximum. See I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1) (seven-year maximum sentence). Accordingly, to show that
the sentence imposed was unreasonable, Ms. Ruiz-Small “must show that the sentence, in light
of the governing criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand,
137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be tailored to
the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 483 (2012)
(quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, focusing on
the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of
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the individual and the public; (3) possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrongdoing.
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the
primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132 (2011).
“The primary purpose of the retained jurisdiction program is to enable the trial court to
gain additional information regarding the defendant’s rehabilitative potential and suitability for
probation.” State v. Jones, 141 Idaho 673, 676 (Ct. App. 2005). “[P]robation is the ultimate
objective of a defendant who is on retained jurisdiction.” Id. at 677. The district court’s decision
to retain jurisdiction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. “There can be no abuse of
discretion in a trial court’s refusal to retain jurisdiction if the court already has sufficient
information upon which to conclude that the defendant is not a suitable candidate for probation.”
Id.
Here, Ms. Ruiz-Small asserts the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence under any reasonable view of the facts. Specifically, she contends the district
court should have sentenced her to a lesser term of imprisonment or retained jurisdiction in light
of the mitigating factors, including her substance abuse issues, poor physical health, acceptance
of responsibility, and amenability towards treatment.
Ms. Ruiz-Small’s substance abuse issues, the impact of her substance abuse on her
behavior, and her need for treatment are strong factors in mitigation. A sentencing court should
give “proper consideration of the defendant’s [substance abuse] problem, the part it played in
causing defendant to commit the crime and the suggested alternatives for treating the problem.”
State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982). The impact of substance abuse on the defendant’s
criminal conduct is “a proper consideration in mitigation of punishment upon sentencing.”
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State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414 n.5 (1981). Here, forty-five-year-old Ms. Ruiz-Small used
heroin from ages nineteen to twenty-six, upon her incarceration in California. (Presentence
Investigation Report (“PSI”),2 p.12.) After she was released from prison, she used methadone
until 2011. (PSI, p.12.) Then, in 2016, Ms. Ruiz-Small started using methamphetamine one to
two times per week. (PSI, p.12.) She asserts her methamphetamine addiction, which undoubtedly
contributed to her criminal behavior, is a strong factor in favor of mitigation.
Along with her substance abuse issues, Ms. Ruiz-Small is in poor health. She has Grave’s
disease, ovary cysts, and “needs an upper GI” for “something in [her] stomach.” (PSI, p.11.) She
also has Type 2 diabetes. (PSI, p.111.) Her poor physical health supports a more lenient
sentence.
Despite her challenges, Ms. Ruiz-Small is ready to get sober and lead a productive life.
She stated at the sentencing and disposition hearing, “I would like a second chance to get my life
right and try and figure it out. I just need the help.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.22, Ls.23–25.) Similarly, her
attorney explained Ms. Ruiz-Small had not participated in a rider, and her attorney believed that
the rider programming would provide Ms. Ruiz-Small with treatment and tools for sobriety. (See
Tr. Vol. I., p.21, L.12–p.22, L.19.) In the PSI, Mr. Ruiz-Small reported that she attended church,
and she believed that her 2016 arrest was “God’s way of saying okay that’s it.” (PSI, pp.7, 12.)
She was highly motivated to remain sober for her family, especially her grandson. (PSI, p.12.)
Ms. Ruiz-Small’s commitment to treatment and sobriety also stand in favor of mitigation.
In light of the above information, Ms. Ruiz-Small asserts the district court did not
exercise reason and thus abused its discretion by sentencing her to five years, with two years
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Citations to the PSI refer to the 234-page electronic document with the confidential exhibits.
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fixed. She maintains the district court should have imposed a lesser sentence or retained
jurisdiction.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Ms. Ruiz-Small’s Probation
The district court is empowered by statute to revoke a defendant’s probation under
certain circumstances. I.C. §§ 19-2602, -2603, 20-222. The Court uses a two-step analysis to
review a probation revocation proceeding. State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009). First, the
Court determines “whether the defendant violated the terms of his probation.” Id. Second, “[i]f it
is determined that the defendant has in fact violated the terms of his probation,” the Court
examines “what should be the consequences of that violation.” Id. The determination of a
probation violation and the determination of the consequences, if any, are separate analyses. Id.
Here, Ms. Ruiz-Small does not challenge her admissions to violating his probation. (See
R., p.123.) “When a probationer admits to a direct violation of her probation agreement, no
further inquiry into the question is required.” State v. Peterson, 123 Idaho 49, 50 (Ct. App.
1992). Rather, Ms. Ruiz-Small submits the district court abused its discretion by revoking her
probation.
“After a probation violation has been proven, the decision to revoke probation and
pronounce sentence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Roy, 113 Idaho
388, 392 (Ct. App. 1987). “A judge cannot revoke probation arbitrarily,” however. State v. Lee,
116 Idaho 38, 40 (Ct. App. 1989). “The purpose of probation is to give the defendant an
opportunity to be rehabilitated under proper control and supervision.” State v. Mummert, 98
Idaho 452, 454 (1977). “In determining whether to revoke probation a court must consider
whether probation is meeting the objective of rehabilitation while also providing adequate
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protection for society.” State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275 (Ct. App. 1995). The court may
consider the defendant’s conduct before and during probation. Roy, 113 Idaho at 392.
In this case, Ms. Ruiz-Small submits the district court erred by revoking her probation
because her probation was achieving its rehabilitative objective. Although Ms. Ruiz-Small had
some difficulties on probation, she asserts the district court should have retained jurisdiction. In
support of her argument, Ms. Ruiz-Small incorporates and respectfully refers this Court to the
argument in Part I.

III.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Ms. Ruiz-Small’s Rule 35 Motions
“A Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence is essentially a plea for leniency, addressed
to the sound discretion of the court.” State v. Carter, 157 Idaho 900, 903 (Ct. App. 2014). In
reviewing the grant or denial of a Rule 35 motion, the Court must “consider the entire record and
apply the same criteria used for determining the reasonableness of the original sentence.” Id. The
Court “conduct[s] an independent review of the record, having regard for the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public interest.” State v. Burdett,
134 Idaho 271, 276 (Ct. App. 2000). “Where an appeal is taken from an order refusing to reduce
a sentence under Rule 35,” the Court’s scope of review “includes all information submitted at the
original sentencing hearing and at the subsequent hearing held on the motion to reduce.” State v.
Araiza, 109 Idaho 188, 189 (Ct. App. 1985). “When presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant
must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently
provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.” State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,
203 (2007).
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Here, Ms. Ruiz-Small maintains the district court did not exercise reason in denying her
Rule 35 motions because the new and additional information supported a reduced sentence. In a
supplement to her motions, Ms. Ruiz-Small informed the district court: (1) she was in the GED
program at the Pocatello Women’s Correctional Center; (2) she “has applied for numerous jobs
at the prison, including kitchen work, laundry work, working with the suicidal, and furnituremaking at the warehouse”; (3) she “is waiting to sign up for relapse prevention, substance abuse
and N.A. companion programs”; and (4) she was “doing as much as she can” within the medium
custody unit. (R., pp.139, 192.) Ms. Ruiz-Small submits this new and additional information
demonstrated her amenability towards treatment and willingness to participate in the rider
program. She asserts the district court did not exercise reason in denying her Rule 35 motions
because it did not give adequate weight to this information. (See R., p.144 (district court’s
decision).) Proper consideration of this information, however, supports a reduction in her
sentences or a period of retained jurisdiction. Therefore, Ms. Ruiz-Small contends the district
court abused its discretion by denying her Rule 35 motions.
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Ruiz-Small respectfully requests this Court reduce her sentences as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, she respectfully requests this Court vacate the district court’s
judgment of conviction and its order revoking probation and remand these cases to the district
court for a new sentencing and disposition hearing. In the alternative, she respectfully requests
this Court vacate the district court’s order denying her Rule 35 motion and remand these cases
for a Rule 35 motion hearing.
DATED this 7th day of January, 2019.

/s/ Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 7th day of January, 2019, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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